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Initial Technical Violations of Debt
Covenants and Changes in Firm
Risk
NEIL L . FARGHER, MICHAEL S. WILKINS AND LORI M .
HOLDER-WEBB*
1. INTRODUCTION
Recent research regarding debt covenant violation has
emphasized the economic consequences of technical default
and the information conveyed to the capital markets by
announcements of technical default. Studies have shown, for
example, that firms manipulate accruals in an effort to postpone
technical violations (e.g., Defend and Jiambalvo, 1994; and
Sweeney, 1994), that the costs of technical violation can be
substantial (Beneish and Press, 1993), and that common share
prices respond negatively when violations are disclosed (Beneish
and Press, 1995a). These studies reveal that technical debt
covenant violations are significant, often recurring, economic
events that are considered important by managers and value-
relevant by common stock investors. We add to this researcb by
investigating tbe cbanges in firm risk tbat are associated with
initial technical debt covenant violations.^
Technical violations of debt covenants arise wben firms fail to
meet tbe contractual requirements contained in debt agreements.
Wben tecbnical default occurs, lenders often waive tbe
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requirements in the expectation that the violation will be
remedied in the short-term. However, even if waivers are obtained
the concessions demanded by lenders often are substantial,
suggesting that lenders view breaches of financing agreements as
significant (Beneish and Press, 1993). In the most extreme cases,
lenders may require accelerated repayment of the violated debt.
Because technical violations point to potentially significant
breaches in firms' financing agreements and, ceteris paribus,
increase the likelihood of debt service default and bankruptcy
(Beneish and Press, 1995b; and Wilkins, 1997) we contend that
violations are likely to signal impending changes in firm risk.^
To test this proposition, we examine the changes in systematic
and unsystematic risk that occur when firms first violate technical
covenants in their debt contracts. We exclude firms experiencing
debt service default because such events reflect relatively more
significant underlying economic problems and are likely to have
direct, immediate cash flow implications for the defaulting firm.
In essence, our purpose is to test whether initial technical
violations are both significant enough and timely enough to
allow users to make predictions about future levels of equity risk
prior to observing more significant events such as debt service
default or bankruptcy.^
Our results indicate that initial debt covenant violations are
associated with significant increases in both systematic and
unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable
primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to
changes in the underlying asset beta. We also show that the
change in unsystematic risk associated with technical default is a
significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after
controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing
financial distress. Moreover, the change in unsystematic risk is
the only significant predictor of delisting for companies that are
dropped from their exchanges three years or more after the
initial violation occurs.
Our findings should be of interest to a number of parties as
they evaluate their relationships with firms that are in danger of
violating their debt contracts. Investors would be expected to be
concerned with the shift in systematic risk since portfolio theory
suggests that only systematic risk is priced in a well-functioning
market. However, parties such as employees, debtholders,
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suppliers, and auditors - who are interested in estimating firm
risk as a step within analytical procedures (Bell et al., 1997) - may
find the results regarding unsystematic risk and delisting to be
equally valuable, given that they may not be capable of fully
diversifying away this element of their business relationships.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next
section develops our hypotheses. Section 3 provides the sample
selection procedure and presents summary statistics, while Section
4 outlines the empirical method. Sections 5 and 6 present our
results and the final section provides concluding remarks.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
While previous theory has posited reasons for the existence of
debt covenants, little theoretical guidance has been provided
regarding the consequences of debt covenant violation. Previous
empirical research finds that most firms that violate their
covenants do so more than once and that technical violations
are associated with an increased likelihood of future financial
distress (e.g., Beneish and Press, 1995b; and Wilkins, 1997). We
build on these findings by predicting that technical violations are
associated with increases in equity risk which can be used to
predict the likelihood of subsequent exchange delisting.
Finance and accounting researchers (e.g., Hamada, 1972;
Hertzel and Jain, 1991; and Hertzel and Rees, 1998) traditionally
have focused on issues involving systematic risk. The emphasis on
systematic risk stems primarily from the fact that it is the only
element of total equity risk (i.e., returns variance) that cannot be
eliminated through diversification. More specifically, it is the only
element of risk that should be priced by investors. As previously
mentioned, however, parties other than equity investors have an
interest in the risk ofthe firm. Trade creditors that have business
relationships with violating firms are likely to be interested in
unsystematic risk, given that these 'firm-specific' effects can
significantly affect a firm's ability to satisfy its existing contracts.
Furthermore, because most violations occur in illiquid private
debt agreements, firms that hold or guarantee the violated debt
are unlikely to be able to satisfactorily diversify away their risks. In
short, because there are parties to the firm other than common
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
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Stockholders, our empirical tests investigate changes in the total
equity risk - both systematic and unsystematic components - of
violating firms.
Our basic proposition is that because technical default
indicates an increased likelihood of further fmancial distress
(e.g., Beneish and Press, 1995b; and Wilkins, 1997), covenant
violations should be associated with increases in firm risk.
Beneish and Press (1995b) argue that technical default is a
strong signal of subsequent distress. Specifically, they show that
the incidence of missed payments (i.e., debt service default) and
bankruptcy is more common after technical default than the
unconditional incidences of these events in the general
population of firms. Beneish and Press (1995b) also find that
Chapter 11 announcement period abnormal returns are less
negative if the announcement is preceded by technical default.
They interpret this result as being consistent with technical
default serving as a timely warning of future financial distress.
Our tests involving changes in risk provide a more direct test of
how market risk perceptions change around the period of the
initial violation.^ We hypothesize that in a reasonably efficient
market, this warning should be manifest in higher levels of risk.
More formally, our hypotheses are as follows:
Hj: Initial technical debt covenant violations are associated
with significant increases in systematic risk.
H2: Initial technical debt covenant violations are associated
with significant increases in unsystematic risk.
One problem inherent in research of this nature is
determining when users first receive information regarding the
event of interest. Previous research has shown that firms often
experience deteriorating financial condition prior to violating
their debt covenants (e.g., Defond andjiambalvo, 1994). If this is
the case and if the deteriorating financial condition is associated
with a material increase in risk, then the power of our tests to
document an increase in risk subsequent to the violation is
reduced. Our work must therefore be viewed as a joint test of the
sufficiency of the debt covenant violation as an indicator of the
change in risk and the timing of the risk shifts surrounding initial
debt covenant violations.
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
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Hypotheses 1 and 2 can be viewed as investigating the short-term
risk efFects associated with initial debt covenant violations. If the
violation is an important signal of long-term fmancial distress, the
changes in systematic and unsystematic risk associated with initial
violations should be positively correlated with future delisting. To
test this relationship, we examine how many of our sample firms
were delisted for fmancial reasons such as liquidation, bankruptcy,
or insufficient capital in periods following the initial covenant
violation. We then test whether the changes in risk associated with
initial violations can be used to predict firms' future delisting status.
We expect that the shifts in systematic and unsystematic risk that are
associated with initial technical covenant violations are positively
related to long-term financial distress, as indicated by exchange
delisting. Accordingly, our last two hypotheses are as follows:
H3: Changes in systematic risk associated with initial debt
covenant violations are positively related to future
delisting.
H4: Changes in unsystematic risk associated with initial debt
covenant violations are positively related to future
delisting.
3. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
The original sample collected for this study contained 275 firms
identified by LEXIS as having debt covenant violations between
1978 and 1995. Thirty-five firms were eliminated because they did
not have at least 200 non-missing returns in both of the event
years. An additional 58 firms were removed because they did not
have complete COMPUSTAT data. Our final sample consists of
182 firms.
For each firm, we examined 10-K or annual report filings in
year —1 and year —2 relative to the first violation disclosure as per
LEXIS to determine whether other violations had occurred prior
to the initially-identified violation year. If violations occurred in
year —1 or year —2, we examined prior 10-K or annual report
filings until we found two consecutive years where the firm was in
full compliance with its covenant requirements. In other words,
the event year (the year in which the initial violation occurred) iS
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
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defined as the first year of debt covenant violation that was
preceded by at least two years of compliance.
We define the violation disclosure date as the trading day
occurring three months after the fiscal year end in which the first
violation occurred. Our results are qualitatively unchanged when
we define the violation disclosure date as the S.E.C. stamp date
on the 10-K filing. However, because many of the 10-K stamp
dates were considerably later than the expected filing date (see
Alford et al., 1994 for potential explanations), the results we
present are those that define the disclosure date as three months
past the violation year-end. As previously mentioned, to the
extent that the violations are pre-empted by specific news
announcements or poor earnings results (e.g., Core and
Schrand, 1997) our tests could fail to find a significant risk shift
around the disclosure date even if such a shift does exist.
Summary statistics for the sample firms are presented in Table
1. Consistent with previous research (e.g. Sweeney, 1994; and
Defond andjiambalvo, 1994), there are systematic trends across
the event period. Specifically, from year —1 to year +1 there are
significant decreases in market value of equity, profitability, and
liquidity.^ All of these trends are consistent with violations
signaling an increase in firm risk. Altman's (1983) Z-score
provides a composite measure of bankruptcy probability. In year
— 1 the mean sample Z-score is 1.956, but by year +1 the Z score
has decreased to 1.235. Altman (1983) considers that firms with
Z<1.20 face a high probability of bankruptcy, so these firms, on
average, are at the edge of the 'gray area' that puts them at
relatively high risk. The decline in the Z-score indicates a
significantly increased probability of bankruptcy associated with
first-time technical violations, a finding which is generally
consistent with an increase in firm risk.'
4. EMPIRICAL METHOD
Our analysis of changes in risk is based on the market model:
et. (1)
Consistent with Healy and Palepu (1990) and Hertzel and Rees
(1998) we omit year 0 in testing for significant changes in risk.
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Table 1
Selected Summary Statistics for the Sample of 182 Firms Having Initial
Technical Debt Covenant Violadons
(Data are presented for year - 1 and year +1 relative to the initial
technical violation)
Market Value of Equity ($nullions)
Mean
Median
Altman's (1983) Z-Score
Mean
Median
Return on Assets
Mean
Median
Current Assets / Current Liabilities
Mean
Median
Sample Firm Annual Raw Returns
Mean
Median
Equal Weighted Index Return
Mean
Median
Year-1
126.845
33.356
1.956
1.952
-0.024
0.007
2.081
1.891
-0.065
-0.151
0.215
0.213
Year+1
92.042
20.715
1.235
1.413
-0.113
-0.029
1.641
1.386
0.047
-0.118
0.299
0.272
Difference
-34.803**
-5.623**
-0.721**
-0.339**
-0.089**
-0.030**
-0.440**
-0.439**
0.112*
0.062
0.084**
0.100**
Notes:
**, * indicates that the year +1 measure is significantly different (/>c0.05, /xO.lO) from the
year 0 measure.
T"-tests (Wilcoxon sign-rank tests) are used to test whether the mean (median) difference
is significantly different from zero.
Market value of equity = fiscal year-end shares * fiscal year-end price from COMPUSTAT.
Return on assets = earnings before extraordinary items / fiscal year-end assets.
Returns are compound returns from days —500 to —251 and -I-l to 4-250.
Specifically, equation (1) is estimated for each firm (J) for the
250-day period ending 251 days prior to the violation disclosure
date (year —1) and for the 250-day period beginning one day
after the violation disclosure date (year +1). The market return
(Rmt) is defined as the return on the CRSP equal-weighted index.^
Our systematic risk tests are based on the changes in mean and
median equity betas (/?,) occurring from year —1 to year +1.
Our investigation of unsystematic risk is also based on equation
(1). Equation (1) shows that a security's return is a linear
® Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
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function of the return on the market plus a random error.
Taking the variance of both sides of equation (1) yields the
following expression:
a] = pyiK) + al (2)
Equation (2) reveals that the total risk (i.e., variance) associated
with a security is determined both by the degree to which its
returns covary with market returns {(3j) and by firm-specific
disturbances that are independent of market returns (erf).
Following Healy and Palepu (1990), we use the variance of the
residuals (a^) from the firm-specific yearly market models to
estimate unsystematic risk.
5. RESULTS
Panel A of Table 2 presents the mean and median levels of
systematic risk across the event period as well as the changes in
systematic risk. Consistent with debt covenant violators being
more risky than the average firm, the mean and median betas are
consistently above one. Furthermore, consistent with hypothesis
1, the average shift in equity beta associated with an initial debt
covenant violation is positive and significant. The mean equity
beta increases from 1.168 in the year prior to violation to 1.327 in
the year following the violation. The mean change of 0.159 is
significant at the one percent level.
Assuming no taxes and only risk-free debt, Hamada (1972)
shows that equity beta is a function of financial leverage and the
underlying asset beta [Posset = {Pequity/^mandal leverage) ]. In
Panel A of Table 2 we investigate the changes in these
components of equity beta.^ Consistent with Healy and Palepu
(1990), we define fmancial leverage as the ratio of the total value
of the firm to the value of firm equity. Equity value is defined as
the market value of common stock plus the book value of
preferred stock, and the total value of the firm is defined as
equity value plus the book value of long- and short-term debt.
Panel A reveals a significant increase in leverage during the
event period (from 2.449 to 2.964).^° To the extent that higher
levels of financial leverage are associated with an increased
probability of bankruptcy, this finding is consistent with the trend
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
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Table 2
Results of Tests for Changes in Risk Around Announcements of 182
Initial Technical Debt Covenant Violations
Year — 1 Year +1 Difference
Panel A: Analysis of Systematic Risk
Hequity
Mean Estimate
Median Estimate
Financial Leverage (VLEV)
Mean Estimate
Median Estimate
Passel
Mean Estimate
Median Estimate
Panel B: Analysis of Unsystematic Risk
Market Model Residual Variance (cr^)
Mean Estimate
Median Estimate
1.168
1.152
2.449
1.944
0.668
0.519
0.155%
0.098%
1.327
1.323
2.964
1.975
0.683
0.520
0.323%
0.179%
0.159**
0.156**
0.515**
0.203**
0.015
-0.016
0.168%**
0.049%**
Notes:
Equity betas are estimated for year —1 and year +1 relative to the initial violation
disclosure year. Financial leverage (VLEV) is defined as (book value of debt plus preferred
stock plus market value of equity) / (market value of equity). Asset beta {I5assn) is the
unlevered equity beta [/^ (.^ ui/,/(VLEV) ].
** indicates significance 3X p < 0.05 (two-tailed). T-statistics (Wilcoxon Sign-Rank
statistics) are used to test whether the mean (median) changes are different from zero.
in Altman's (1983) Z-score, as documented in Table 1. The
leverage effect appears particularly dominant in explaining the
change in equity beta, given the trends in asset beta. Specifically,
the mean asset beta of 0.668 in year —1 is not significantly different
from the mean asset beta of 0.683 in year +1. Overall, the results
from Panel A of Table 2 are consistent with initial technical debt
covenant violations signaling significant increases in systematic
risk, due primarily to increasing amounts of financial leverage.
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes the changes in unsystematic risk
associated with initial debt covenant violations. The median
residual variance increases from 0.098% in the year prior to the
violation to 0.179% in the year subsequent to the violation. The
median change is significant at the one percent level. The
change in mean levels is equally dramatic, with unsystematic risk
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
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more than doubling from year —1 to year -f-l (0.155% to
0.323%). Furthermore, 75% of the firms displayed higher levels
of residual variance in year +1 than in year —1. Therefore,
consistent with hypothesis 2, debt covenant violations are
associated with significant increases in unsystematic ^^
6. LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF TECHNICAL VIOLATION: SUBSEQUENT
DELISTING
Prior research (e.g. Beneish and Press, 1995b; Wilkins, 1997; and
Foster et al., 1998) has shown that firms with debt covenant
violations tend to suffer further fmancial distress. As a result,
contractual parties are likely to be interested in determining
whether violating firms will continue to be economically viable.
In this section we consider whether the changes in risk that are
associated with initial technical violations can be used to predict
stock exchange delisting in future years. Our investigation of
delisting status revealed that of the 182 sample firms, 50 (27%)
were eventually delisted due to liquidation, bankruptcy,
insufficient capital, or other financial reasons (i.e., events having
CRSP delisting codes greater than 399). Of these 50 violators,
three were delisted within one year of the initial violation, an
additional 17 were dropped from one to two years after the initial
violation, 11 were delisted between two and three years following
the initial violation, and the remaining 19 firms were delisted
four years or more from the date of the initial violation.
To investigate the relationship between changes in risk and
subsequent delisting, we estimated the following LOGIT model:
DELIST^ = 71 + 72 GC^  + 73NOWAIVE^ + 74GHGVLEV,
+ 75CHGBKPROB^ -I- 76CHGMVEy + 77GHGSYS^
+ 78CHGUNSYS^ - + EJ. (3)
In equation (3), DELIST is equal to 1 if the firm had been
delisted for financial reasons by the end of 1997 and is equal to 0
otherwise. To control for the information content of the
auditor's report and lender's waiver decision, we include two
dummy variables that are equal to one if the firm received a
going concern audit opinion (GC) or failed to receive a default
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waiver (NOWAIVE), respectively, at the time of the initial
technical violation, and are equal to zero otherwise. Given that
systematic risk is a positive function of both fmancial leverage
and default risk (Copeland and Weston, 1988), equation (3) also
includes tbe year - 1 to year +1 cbange in VLEV (CHGVLEV)
and bankruptcy probability (CHGBKPROB).^ ^ Finally, we
include the change in logged market value of equity (GHGMVE)
to control for any significant decreases in equity value that might
lead to delisting. CHGSYS and CHGUNSYS are the year - 1 to
year +1 changes in equity beta and market model residual
variance, respectively, as defined in Table 2.^ ^
Tbe results of the delisting model are presented in Table 3.
Consistent witb previous research noting tbat going concern
opinions often precede bankruptcy (e.g., Raghunandan and
Rama, 1995; Wilkins, 1997; and Holder-Webb and Wilkins, 1999),
GC is positive and significant. Furthermore, botb GHGVLEV and
GHGBKPROB are significantly positive, indicating that firms with
larger increases in leverage and default risk are more likely to
face delisting in future periods. Hypotbesis 3, whicb predicts a
greater likelihood of delisting for firms with increases in
systematic risk, is not supported by tbe data. Tbat is, after
controlling for changes in fmancial leverage and default risk, the
cbange in equity beta is not an important predictor of future
delisting. However, the significant positive relationsbip between
GHGUNSYS and DELIST does support hypotbesis 4. Firms with
larger increases in unsystematic risk are more likely to be delisted
in future periods.
It is also interesting to note tbat the significance of GHGUNSYS
is not determined by tbe delistings occurring immediately after
tbe initial violation. That is, although it is reasonable to expect
tbat tbe relationship between the cbange in unsystematic risk
and subsequent delisting would be driven by the delistings
occurring relatively close to tbe time of the initial violation, we do
not find this to be tbe case. In Panel B of Table 3, we re-estimate
equation (3) after removing firms tbat were delisted witbin two
years of the initial violation. In tbis model, GHGUNSYS is the
only variable that continues to be a significant (/rvalue < 0.08)
predictor of future delisting. Therefore, tbe cbange in
unsystematic risk that is associated with a firm's first debt
covenant violation is a significant predictor of severe distress
© Blackwcll Publishers Ltd 2001
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Table 3
LOGIT Regression Evidence Regarding the Relationship Between
Future Delisting and Changes in Risk Associated with Initial Technical
Debt Covenant Violations
DELIST, = 7i -t- jiGCj + 73NOWAIVEy + 74GHGVLEVy -t- 75CHGBKPROBJ
-t- 76GHGMVEy + 77CHGSYSJ -t- 78GHGUNSYS^- + Sj
71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78
Panel A: Complete Sample (N = 182)
Coefficient estimate
/(-value
Pseudo /J-Square
-1.94
0.01
0.205
Panel B: Delistings Within Two
Coefficient estimate
/(-value
Pseudo /{-Square
-1.91
0.01
0.103
0.86
0.06
Years
0.40
0.48
-0 .22
0.59
0.21
0.02
of Initial Violation
-0 .45
0.35
0.15
0.21
0.35
0.02
-0 .35
0.28
Removed (JV =
0.10
0.62
-0.39
0.28
-0.16
0.45
150)
0.20
0.45
110.90
0.05
111.70
0.08
Note^.
DELIST = 1 for firms with CRSP delisting codes in excess of 399 (e.g. delisting due to
liquidation, bankruptcy, insufficient capital, etc.).
DELIST = 0 for all other firms (firms still active or delisted due to mergers or exchanges
of stock).
GG = 1 if going concern opinion received, 0 otherwise.
NOWATVE = 1 if no waiver received, = 0 if waiver received.
CHGVLEV = Year - 1 to Year +1 change in VLEV (as defined in Table 2).
CHGBKPROB= Y e a r - 1 to Year+1 change in Altman's (1983) Z-score multiplied b y - 1 .
GHGMVE = Year —1 to Year +1 change in logged market value of equity.
GHGSYS = Year - 1 to Year +1 change in equity beta.
GHGUNSYS = Year —1 to Year -H change in unsystematic risk (market model residual
variance).
(and, hence, future delisting) even when the delisting occurs
three or more years after the initial incident of default. Stated
differently, the change in unsystematic risk is a better predictor
of severe future financial distress than the audit opinion, changes
in equity value, changes in leverage, and changes in default risk.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Technical debt covenant violations involve potentially significant
breaches in firms' financing agreements; we argue that such
breaches are likely to be associated with significant increases in
violating firms' risk. To test this proposition, we investigate the
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changes in systematic and unsystematic risk associated with first-
time technical violations. We also test whether the observed
changes in risk have explanatory power incremental to other
factors commonly associated with financial distress in estimating
the likelihood that firms will be dropped from their exchanges in
subsequent periods.
Our results indicate that both systematic risk and unsystematic
risk increase around initial debt covenant violations. The
increase in systematic risk appears to be due primarily to an
increase in financial leverage rather than a change in the
underlying asset beta. We also find that increases in unsystematic
risk are important predictors of future delisting, even after
controlling f^ or changes in leverage, bankruptcy probability, and
equity value.
Our results are open to two interpretations. The first is that
investors use disclosures regarding technical default in their risk
assessments and pricing decisions. A second interpretation is that
the risk measures and the violation announcements jointly refiect
the same underlying deterioration in the firm's financial
condition and that investors are reacting to those events.
Whatever the case, our results can be viewed as evidence of the
sufficiency of first-time technical debt covenant violations as
indicators of material changes in risk. Future research could
examine the complex interdependencies that exist between the
events that arise before, during, and after incidents of technical
default.
NOTES
1 'Debt covenant violation' or 'technical default' refers to the technical
violation of an accounting-based debt covenant, such as minimum tangible
net worth, minimum profitability, etc. In contrast, 'debt service default'
refers to a missed principal or interest payment. Firms that initially were in
debt service default as well as technical default are not included in our
analysis.
2 In addition to academic studies, anecdotal evidence suggests that technical
violations are viewed as important signals of future distress. For example,
Iridium LLC recently violated the revenue and customer subscription
covenants in an |800 million credit facility, causing |750 million in an
additional facility to be in default as well. These technical violations raised
questions about the firm being able to make its next interest payment and
'heightened concern that Iridium ... might have to file for bankruptcy
© Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001
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protection from creditors' {The Wall Street Journal, August 12, 1999).
Bondholders put forth an involuntary Chapter 11 petition the following
day.
3 Wilkins (1994) notes that only six percent of firms violating debt covenants
between 1978 and 1988 experienced debt service default at the same time as
their first technical violation, suggesting that debt service default typically is
not the first signal of financial distress (see also Beneish and Press, 1995b).
For the 13 firms (approximately five percent) from our original sample that
experienced debt service default along with their first technical violation,
the change in equity risk is directly comparable to that of our final sample of
182 initial technical violators.
4 Recent research in finance suggests that systematic risk, as measured by
beta, is not an adequate proxy for risk that is priced. Dichev (1998) finds
that a distress factor, the risk of bankruptcy, is not associated with systematic
risk but is rewarded by higher returns. To the extent that beta does not
capture the total risk of interest to investors and other parties there is a
need to investigate both systematic and unsystematic risk.
5 Studies such as Beneish and Press (1995a and 1995b) use price revisions as a
proxy for the information inferred by the market at the time of the violation
announcement. Price revisions can be a function of both expected future
cash flows and the expected risk of future cash flows. Given that the nature
of the covenant violation relates to the underlying risk of tbe firm, our tests
provide a valuable alternative measure of the information associated with
debt covenant violations.
6 Similar results obtain if we use sales as the denominator in the measure of
profitability (Sweeney, 1994) to reduce the potential impact of strategic
accounting policy choices impacting earnings.
7 We also investigated the frequency of auditor changes in our sample of
technical violators. Twenty-two of our 182 firms (roughly 12 percent)
changed auditors in the year of their first violation. Two changed from a
non-Big 6 auditor to another non-Big 6 auditor; nine changed from a non-
Big 6 auditor to a Big 6 auditor; one changed from a Big 6 auditor to a non-
Big 6 auditor; and ten changed from a Big 6 auditor to another Big 6
auditor. When we restrict our empirical analysis to the 160 firms not
changing auditors our results are unchanged. Furthermore, no noteworthy
risk-oriented relationships exist within any of the auditor change sub-
classifications.
8 Betas estimated using the value-weighted index and the method of Scholes
and Williams (1977) exhibit similar trends.
9 Hamada's specification for the unlevered beta assumes that the systematic
risk of debt is zero. This assumption is not likely to hold for our sample of
firms if covenant violations are associated with increases in default risk. If
the risk of default and the systematic risk of debt vary during the period we
examine and this variance is not captured completely by changes in
financial leverage, the unlevered beta presented in Panel A includes both
cbanges in the asset beta and changes in the systematic risk of debt.
10 Hertzel and Rees (1998) document a mean increase in financial leverage
from 1.68 (year —1) to 1.82 (year +1) for their sample of firms privately
placing equity securities. The significantly larger mean estimates for our
sample of debt covenant violators are consistent with debt covenant
violators being more highly leveraged than other firms.
11 The changes in unsystematic risk are found to be equally significant using
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the Chi-square test of Healy and Palepu (1990).
12 CHGBKPROB is defined as the year —1 to year +1 change in Altman's
(1983) Z-score, multiplied by —1 to simplify interpretation of the regression
coefficient. In other words, a positive value for CHGBKPROB indicates an
increasing probability of bankruptcy.
13 To control for the potential bias arising from the endogeneity of changes in
risk and the independent variables presented in equation (3), we used a
two-stage approach as a sensitivity test. In the first step, we regressed each
risk measure on the remaining independent variables (GC, NOWATVE,
CHGVLEV, GHGBKPROB, and CHGMVE). We then used the residuals
from these models in place of CHGSYS and CHGUNSYS in equation (3).
Our results using this specification are virtually identical to the results
presented in Table 3.
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